

The concept of *Cause* is a relevant matter to philosophical studies. Since Davidson's proposal (1967) it is widely studied in natural language because of its relationship with events ontology (cf. DOWTY, 1989; LEWIS, 1973; RAMCHAND, 2008; ROTHSTEIN, 2004; PYLKKÄNEN, 2008, among others). One can say that *Cause* has a prominent position on the linguistic agenda and a significant role in the organization of grammars. This work intends to study a more specific phenomenon about the general notion of *Cause*: the causativization process, which consists, according to Pylkkänen (2008), in the addition of the primitive predicate CAUSE to structures that at first do not have it. Thus, "causativization" is a semantic phenomenon with syntactic implications because thereby transitive verbs are constructed from intransitive bases. To clarify the phenomenon some examples of causativization are given below, being *a* the basic intransitive construction and *b* the causative counterpart.

- (1) a. The horse jumped over the fence.  
b. The polo player jumped the horse over the fence.
- (2) a. The dog walked itself home.  
b. Jane walked the dog home.

Our interpretation of the sentences with the *b* index is that their conclusions were "indirectly caused". That is, the only argument of the intransitive structure of the verb is "forced" to play a role in the event. For example, in (1b) we can see that "the horse" does not jump over the fence volitionally, but is forced by the "polo player" to do this. For this reason, the meaning of *b* sentences can be paraphrased by periphrastic causatives with *make* as (1c) *The polo player made the horse jump over the fence* and (2c) *Jane made the dog walk home*. Interestingly, not all the verbs that can compose a periphrastic causative are licensed to causativize, like in:

- (3) a. John made Mary cry.  
b.\*John cried Mary.
- (4) a. Inhaling pollen makes me cough.  
b.\*Inhaling pollen coughs me.

Two questions arise at once: (i) why only a small sample of verbs inside the same class of verbs causativizes? and (ii) what factors constrain the causativization? Our goal on this inquiry is to answer those questions by analyzing the causativization of inergatives on the basis of Brazilian Portuguese (BP) data. The theoretical framework in which we are inserted is the event-based semantics, since *Cause* is a relationship between events (cf. RAMCHAND, 2008; ROTHSTEIN, 2004, among others). Our hypothesis is that what constrains the causativization is the composition of the subunits of the event, which are, following Ramchand (2008), Initiation [init], Process [proc] and Result [res]. Or, if we consider Dowty's nomenclature: DO, BECOME and CAUSE. In this inquiry we will adopt the proposal of Ramchand (2008) to analyze our data because we believe that her model presents an elegant ontology to treat causation. The machinery of the model is simple and can account for any linguistic structure, but it presents some problems that we want to discuss.

Ramchand's model is based on the notion of causation because for her observable causes, changes and effects are intuitions that seem to be more secure to treat the relationship between world and language. According to her "[...] all that is necessary for our purposes is to establish the existence of a primitive notion at this level of abstraction that corresponds to the linguistic reality of how speakers conceive events and their components" (RAMCHAND, 2008, p. 25). The participant relations must be objectively described on those terms. Thus, Ramchand proposes three notions to be the abstract structuring principles behind all eventive predications: Initiation (a causing subevent represented by [init]), Process (a subevent that represents change through time and is the core of dynamic predicates, represented by [proc]) and Result (associated with the resultant state which is made explicit by the lexical predicate).

Each of the three notions has its own syntactic node and an abstract category related to it, being the argument that fills the specifier position of the node INITIATOR, UNDERGOER or RESULTEE. For the author these three notions are the ones necessary to express all and only the generalizations about verb meaning and verb flexibility that we find in natural language. On the basis of this, she argues that verbal predicates will be the result of the sum of those primitive notions. Then, an event can have all the three notions but this is not necessary condition. For example, we can find activities with the event structure of [init, proc] subunits or only [proc]; accomplishments can be [init, proc, res], [init, proc] or only [proc]; and achievements can be [init, proc, res] or [proc, res] (to see more cf. RAMCHAND, 2008, p. 108). We believe that the proposal of Ramchand (2008) can be a good “first point” to analyze causativization, but there are some problems that must be discussed to give a good approach to the phenomenon. The biggest problem that we found is that, talking about causativization, Ramchand (2008) asserts that verbs with [init] in their semantic structure would not license causativization but, at the same time, she says that inergatives must have an [init] component because they are basic INITIATOR verbs. We want to discuss this idea and show that Ramchand’s intuition isn’t so right, then some examples of causativization of inergatives are given below with the representation of its semantic structure (according to Ramchand’s proposal).

- (5) a. A gente viaja a banda pelo Brasil todo. [init, proc]  
1PP travel3PPPast DEFband around Brazil ‘we travel the band around Brasil’
- b. O professor sentou as crianças no chão. [init, proc]  
DEFteacher sit3PSPast DEFchildren on the floor ‘the teacher sits the kids on the floor’
- c. Eu subi a menina no brinquedo. [init, proc]  
1PS got up1PSPast DEFgirl on the toy ‘i get the girl up on the toy’

As we can see, all the inergatives above have an [init] subunit and license causativization. So, if the generalization from Ramchand does not work, what is the rule that constrain causativization? We felt the need to develop a more general working hypothesis for the causativization inside this theoretical frame. Thus, our proposal to this inquiry is discuss the primitive subunits of events proposed by Ramchand (2008) and reconsider the composition of inergative verbs. Maybe, as Ramchand suggests in her 2013’s paper, there might be more than an Initiator, a Process and a Result projections inside the verbal domain. So, our propose is that what constrains a verb to causativize is its event structure, more specifically it’s a subunit of the event which can’t be Initiator, Process or Result: the template of the events denoted by inergatives must be another. We hope to show with this inquiry a first analyzes of causativization as a result from the composition of the subunits of events.

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